How the world lines up in space.
Activity beyond Earth now runs on two rival frameworks: one led by the United States, one led by China and Russia. Most countries lean one way. The interesting ones refuse to choose. Tap any country to see where it sits, who it builds with, and where the legal walls are.
Space has split into two camps.
This map shows who sides with whom, who plays both sides, and where cooperation legally cannot happen. The tour walks you through it in five short steps.
US-led camp
70countries have signed the Artemis Accords, as of July 2026.
China-led camp
17countries have joined the ILRS lunar programme, plus 50+ institutions.
Launch record
92Chinese orbital launches in 2025, up 35 percent in one year.
The legal wall
2011the year the Wolf Amendment barred NASA from working with China.
Why two camps, not one.
The split is not only about friendship. Four forces hold the camps apart, and one of them is written into US law.
Force 01 · The legal wall
NASA cannot work with China. At all.
The US Wolf Amendment, in force since 2011, bars NASA from bilateral cooperation with China. Even if the politics softened tomorrow, the two civil programmes could not legally sit inside one framework. A bill to make the ban permanent was introduced in July 2025, and the restriction was reaffirmed in January 2026. This law, more than any single disagreement, is why there have to be two structures.
Force 02 · Ownership
Who owns what gets mined on the Moon.
The Artemis Accords state that extracting space resources does not count as claiming territory, which gives companies legal comfort to plan lunar mining. China, Russia and many legal scholars argue this prejudges an unsettled question and writes US domestic law into the global commons, favouring whoever gets there first. This is the sharpest legal fault line between the camps.
Force 03 · Who sets the rules
A coalition of the willing, or the UN.
The Accords are a US-led coalition built around NASA, signed one country at a time, outside the United Nations where space law has traditionally been negotiated. China and Russia present the ILRS as an alternative order with self-reliance at its core. Both sides claim the 1967 Outer Space Treaty supports them.
Force 04 · Data and standards
Two systems built not to interoperate.
Artemis pushes common technical standards and open scientific data so partners can plug into each other. The ILRS runs its own separate data and analysis mechanisms. A satellite, a standard or a dataset that works in one camp does not simply cross into the other. On top sits export-control law, ITAR in the US and the EU's tightened dual-use rules, which decide what hardware can move at all.
Side by side
The two frameworks, compared.
Sources: US State Department · ASIL · Wolf Amendment explainer
The blocs are the backdrop. The hedge is the behaviour.
The camps are rigid on lunar law and sensitive technology. They are leaky on commercial launch and earth-observation data, where money crosses the line constantly.
The hedge in one image
A US-aligned Arab satellite, on a Chinese rocket.
On 10 December 2025, Arab Satellite 813, the region's first joint hyperspectral earth-observation satellite, reached orbit. It was led by the UAE, a founding Artemis signatory, carried payloads from Egypt and Nepal, and launched on China's Lijian-1 rocket.
One satellite, both camps. That is the normal condition of the middle powers.
Source: UAE Space Agency, Dec 2025
Five countries playing both sides
Buys European satellites, launches on Indian rockets, hosts Chinese ground stations, and has signed both Artemis and the ILRS.
Will fly a satellite on NASA's Artemis II mission, and sat down with China in July 2026 to discuss joining the ILRS.
Hosts US launch technology at Alcantara under a safeguards treaty, and has built CBERS satellites with China since 1988.
Signed the Artemis Accords in 2023, yet hosts a Chinese military-linked deep-space station in Patagonia, with about 10 percent of the antenna time.
Contributes to the US-led lunar Gateway while leading the Arab satellite that flew on a Chinese rocket.
Where the pattern shows most clearly.
Australia
The exception that proves the rule.
Cleanly US-aligned, because its role is tracking and defense, where hedging is not tolerated. It hosts NASA's Canberra deep-space complex, one of only three stations keeping contact with missions across the solar system, and sits inside AUKUS and the Quad. Gilmour Space attempted the first Australian orbital launch in July 2025, with a second try planned for 2026.
Sources: Australian Space Agency · Space.com
South America
Both flags on the same soil.
Brazil launches US-licensed technology from Alcantara and builds satellites with China in parallel. Argentina signed the US accords and hosts a Chinese military-linked station it barely controls, a standing point of US concern. The region's other signers, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, lean US while keeping commercial doors open.
Sources: US State Dept · The Diplomat
The Gulf
Well funded, moving fast, hedging openly.
The UAE flew a probe to Mars and contributes to the US-led Gateway. Saudi Arabia courts both lunar blocs at once under Vision 2030. Oman is building the Etlaq spaceport at Duqm, already chosen by Spain's PLD Space, due to open by 2027. The pattern: US-aligned membership sitting on top of active Chinese launch ties.
Sources: SpaceNews · Via Satellite
Reading the capability view
Three roles on the map.
Established powers
Design, build and launch independently: the US, China, Russia, India, Japan, and Europe's big four.
Builders
National launch or manufacturing, still scaling: South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Brazil, the UAE, Turkey.
Operators
Own and use satellites, mostly built or launched by partners: much of Southeast Asia, the Gulf, Latin America.
Dependent
No national programme of record. Rely on foreign satellites, launch and data.
Plain-language glossary
Five terms that explain the whole map.
Artemis Accords
US-led principles for behaviour in space, signed country by country with NASA since 2020. Non-binding, but they define the Western camp.
ILRS
The International Lunar Research Station: the China-Russia plan for a Moon base, with phases, missions and its own governance. The rival camp's anchor project.
Wolf Amendment
A US law from 2011 that bans NASA from bilateral work with China. The hard wall at the centre of the map.
Dual-use
Technology with both civil and military applications, like radar imaging or precise navigation. The moment a capability turns dual-use, export law switches on and the list of possible partners shrinks.
Hedging
Deliberately keeping ties to both camps at once. The normal strategy of mid-sized states that want technology from everyone and dependence on no one.
Method and sources
Where every claim comes from.
Compiled August 2026 from national space agencies, the US State Department, ESA, trade press and the AsiaBerlin research files. Facts are current to mid-2026. Where a fact is less certain, the country profile says so. Country positions are a judgement call on the evidence below, not an official designation.